Communication and Artificial Intelligence:  Opportunities and Challenges for the 21st Century by Gunkel, David J.
communication +1
Volume 1
Issue 1 Futures of Communication Article 1
August 2012
Communication and Artificial Intelligence:
Opportunities and Challenges for the 21st
Century
David J. Gunkel
Northern Illinois University, dgunkel@niu.edu
Abstract
This essay advocates for a significant reorientation and reconceptualization of communication studies
in order to accommodate the opportunities and challenges introduced by increasingly intelligent
machines, autonomous decision making systems, and smart devices. Historically the discipline of
communication has accommodated new technology by transforming these innovations into a medium
of human interaction and message exchange. With the computer, this transaction is particularly
evident with the development of computer-mediated communication (CMC) in the later half of the
20th century. In CMC, the computer is understood and investigated as a more-or-less neutral channel
of message transfer and instrument of human interaction. This formalization, although not necessarily
incorrect, neglects the fact that the computer, unlike previous technological advancements, also
occupies the position of participant in communicative exchanges. Evidence of this is already available
in the science of AI and has been explicitly described by some of the earliest writings on
communication and the computer. The essay therefore 1) demonstrates that the CMC paradigm,
although undeniably influential and successful, is insufficient and no longer tenable and 2) argues that
communication studies needs to rework its basic framework in order to address and respond to the
unique technological challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.
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Introduction 
In a now well-known and often reproduced New Yorker cartoon by Peter Steiner, 
two dogs sit in front of an Internet-connected computer. The one operating the 
machine says to his companion, "On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog."1 
The cartoon has often been cited to address issues of identity and anonymity in 
computer-mediated communication (CMC). According to this particular reading, 
what the cartoon portrays is that who or what one is in CMC is, as Sandy Stone, 
Sherry Turkle, and others have demonstrated, something that can be easily and 
endlessly reconfigured. This interpretation, although not necessarily incorrect, 
misses the more interesting and suggestive insight that is provided by the wired 
canines. What the cartoon illustrates is not only the anonymity and indeterminacy 
of others in CMC but also the unquestioned assumption that despite this 
anonymity, users assume that the other with whom they interact and communicate 
is another human being. The other who confronts us is always, it is assumed, 
another human person, like ourselves. These others may be "other" in a "celebrate 
diversity" sense of the word—another race, another gender, another ethnicity, 
another social class, etc. But they are never a dog. Consequently, what the cartoon 
illustrates, through a kind of clever inversion, is the standard operating 
presumption of mainstream communication theory and practice. Online identity 
is, in fact, reconfigurable. You can be a dog, or you can say you are. But everyone 
knows, or so it is assumed, that what is on the other end of the fiber-optic cable is 
another human user, someone who is, despite what are often interpreted as minor 
variations in physical appearance and background, essentially like we assume 
ourselves to be.  
This essay investigates and seeks to intervene in this deep-seated and often 
unquestioned assumption, tracing the effect it has on our current understanding 
and the future direction of communication studies. In particular it explicitly 
recognizes and endeavors to deal with the fact that the majority of online 
communication is not human-to-human (H2H) exchanges but, as Norbert Wiener 
had already predicted in 1950, interactions between humans and machines and 
machines and machines.2 Current statistics concerning web traffic already give 
machines a slight edge with 51% of all activity being otherwise than human.3 And 
this figure is expected to increase at an accelerated rate. In a recent white paper, 
Cisco Systems predicts that machine-to-machine (M2M) data exchanges will 
                                                 
1
 Peter Steiner, "Dog Cartoon," The New Yorker (1993): 61. 
2
 Norbert Wiener,  The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (Boston: 
Ad Capo Press, 1988), 16.   
3
 Tom Foremski, "Report: 51% of Website Traffic is 'Non-human' and Mostly 
Malicious." ZDNet, 3 March 2012. http://www.zdnet.com/blog/foremski/report-51-of-
web-site-traffic-is-non-human-and-mostly-malicious/2201 
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grow, on average, 86 percent a year, and will reach 507 petabytes a month by 
2016.4 Even if one doubts the possibility of ever achieving what has traditionally 
been called "strong AI," the fact is our world is already populated by semi-
intelligent artifacts or smart devices that increasingly play the role not of 
communications medium but of information source or receiver. Communication 
studies, it will be argued, must come to terms with this development and reorient 
its theoretical framework so as to be able to accommodate and respond to 
situations where the other in communicative exchange is no longer exclusively 
human. This is, more than anything else, what will define the opportunities and 
challenges for communication research in the 21st century.  
 
AI and Communication 
Whether it is explicitly acknowledged or not, communication (and 
"communication" as the concept is understood and mobilized in the discipline of 
communication studies) is fundamental to both the theory and practice of artificial 
intelligence (AI). In particular, it is communication that provides the science with 
its definitive test case and experimental evidence. This is immediately evident in 
the agenda-setting paper that is credited with defining machine intelligence, Alan 
Turing's "Computing Machinery and Intelligence." Although the title "artificial 
intelligence" is a product of the Dartmouth Conference of 1956, it is Turing's 
1950 paper and its "game of imitation," or what is now routinely called "the 
Turing Test," that defines and characterizes the discipline. Although Turing 
begins his essay by proposing to consider the question "Can machines think?" he 
immediately recognizes persistent and seemingly irresolvable terminological 
difficulties with the question itself. For this reason, he proposes to pursue an 
alternative line of inquiry, one that can, as he describes it, be "expressed in 
relatively unambiguous words."  "The new form of the problem can be described 
in terms of a game which we call the 'imitation game.' It is played with three 
people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either 
sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart from the other two. The object of the 
game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and 
which is the woman."5 This determination is to be made on the basis of simple 
                                                 
4
 Cisco Systems, Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast 




 Alan Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," in Computer Media and 
Communication: A Reader, ed. Paul A. Meyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 37. 
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questions and answers. The interrogator asks A and B various questions, and 
based on their responses to these inquiries tries to discern whether the respondent 
is a man or a woman. "In order that tone of voice may not help the interrogator," 
Turing further stipulates, "the answers should be written, or better still, 
typewritten. The ideal arrangement is to have a teleprinter communicating 
between the two rooms."6 (Figure 1). In this way, the initial arrangement of the 
"game of imitation" is, as Turing describes it, computer-mediated communication 
(CMC) avant la lettre. The interrogator interacts with two unknown participants 
via a form of synchronous computer-mediated interaction that we now routinely 
call "chat." Because the exchange takes place via text messages routed through 
the instrumentality of a machine, the interrogator cannot see or otherwise perceive 
the identity of the two interlocutors and must, therefore, ascertain gender based on 
responses that are supplied to questions like "Will X please tell me the length of 
his/her hair."7 Like the wired canines with which we began, the identity of the 
interlocutors is something that is hidden from view and only able to be 
ascertained by way of the messages that come to be exchanged. 
 
Figure 1: The Game of Imitation, Phase One 
(Image provided by http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test) 
Turing then takes his thought experiment one step further. "We can now 
ask the question, 'What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this 
game?' Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like 
                                                 
6
 Turing, 37-38. 
7
 Turing, 37. 
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this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These 
questions replace our original, 'Can machines think?'"8 In other words, if the man 
(A) in the game of imitation is replaced with a computing machine, would this 
device be able to respond to questions and "pass" as another person, effectively 
fooling the interrogator into thinking that it was just another human interlocutor? 
(Figure 2). It is this question, according to Turing, that replaces the initial and 
unfortunately ambiguous inquiry "Can machines think?" Consequently, if a 
computer does in fact becomes capable of successfully simulating a human being, 
of either gender, in communicative exchanges with a human interrogator to such 
an extent that the interrogator cannot tell whether he is interacting with a machine 
or another human being, then that machine would, Turing concludes, need to be 
considered "intelligent." 
 
Figure 2: The Game of Imitation, Phase Two 
(Image provided by http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test) 
 
At the time that Turing published the paper, he estimated that the tipping 
point—the point at which a machine would be able to successfully play the game 
                                                 
8
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of imitation—was at least half-a-century in the future. "I believe that in about fifty 
year's time it will be possible to programme computers, with a storage capacity of 
about 109, to make them play the imitation game so well that an average 
interrogator will not have more than 70 per cent chance of making the right 
identification after five minutes of questioning."9 It did not take that long. Already 
in 1966 Joseph Weizenbaum demonstrated a simple natural language processing 
application that was able to converse with human interrogators in such a way as to 
appear to be another intelligent agent. ELIZA, as the application was called, was a 
chatter-bot.10 It was, technically speaking, a rather simple piece of programming, 
"consisting mainly of general methods for analyzing sentences and sentence 
fragments, locating so-called key words in texts, assembling sentence from 
fragments, and so on. It had, in other words, no built-in contextual framework of 
universe of discourse. This was supplied to it by a 'script.' In a sense ELIZA was 
an actress who commanded a set of techniques but who had nothing of her own to 
say." 11  Despite this, Weizenbaum's program demonstrated what Turing had 
initially predicted: "ELIZA created the most remarkable illusion of having 
understood in the minds of many people who conversed with it. People who know 
very well that they were conversing with a machine soon forgot that fact, just as 
theatergoers, in the grip of suspended disbelief, soon forget that the action they 
are witnessing is not 'real.' This illusion was especially strong and most 
tenaciously clung to among people who know little or nothing about computers. 
They would often demand to be permitted to converse with the system in private, 
and would, after conversing with it for a time, insist, in spite of my explanations, 
that the machine really understood them."12  
Although there is a good deal that could be said in response to Turing's 
essay, the game of imitation, and empirical demonstrations like that provided by 
ELIZA, let me highlight two consequences that are especially important for 
communications research. First and foremost, Turing's essay situates 
communication as the deciding factor in AI. Because "the original question 'Can 
machines think?'" is considered by Turing to be "too meaningless," 13  he 
reformulates and refers the inquiry to a demonstration of communicative ability. 
                                                 
9
 Turing, 44. 
10
 The generic term "chatter bot" was not utilized by Weizenbaum. It is first introduced in 
1994 by Michael Maudlin, founder and chief scientist of Lycos, to identify another 
natural language processing application called Julia. 
11
 Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to 
Calculation (San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman, 1976), 188. 
12
 Weizenbaum, 189.  
 
13
 Turing, 37. 
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This is not a capricious decision, there is a good scientific reason for proceeding 
in this manner, and it has to do with what philosophers routinely call "the other 
minds problem." "How does one determine," as Paul Churchland characterizes it, 
"whether something other than oneself—an alien creature, a sophisticated robot, a 
socially active computer, or even another human—is really a thinking, feeling, 
conscious being; rather than, for example, an unconscious automaton whose 
behavior arises from something other than genuine mental states?"14 And this 
difficulty, as Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic and Daniel Persson explain, is rooted in 
the undeniable fact that "we have no access to the inner workings of human 
minds—much less than we have access to the inner workings of a computing 
system."15 In effect, we cannot, as Donna Haraway puts it, climb into the heads of 
others "to get the full story from the inside."16 Consequently, attempts to resolve 
or at least respond to this problem inevitably involve some kind of behavioral 
demonstration or test, like Turing's game of imitation. "To put this another way," 
Roger Schank concludes, "we really cannot examine the insides of an intelligent 
entity in such a way as to establish what it actually knows. Our only choice is to 
ask and observe."17 For Turing, as for many in the field of AI who follow his 
innovative approach, intelligence is something that is not directly observable. It is, 
therefore, evidenced and decided on the basis of behaviors that are considered to 
be a sign or symptom of intelligence—communication in general and human-level 
verbal conversation in particular. In other words, because intelligent thought is 
not directly observable, the best one can do is deal with something, like 
communicative interaction, that is routinely considered a product of intelligence 
and which can in fact be empirically observed, measured, and evaluated.  
Second and directly following from this, Turing's proposal makes the 
assumption that communication is a product of intelligence. This means that 
anything—another human being, an animal, a machine, etc.—that is capable of 
performing communicative operations on par with what is typically expected of 
another human individual, irrespective of what actually goes on inside the head or 
                                                 
14
 Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 67. 
15
 Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic and Daniel Persson, "Towards Trustworthy Intelligent 
Robots - A Pragmatic Approach to Moral Responsibility." Paper presented to the North 
American Computing and Philosophy Conference, NA-CAP@IU 2008. Indiana 
University, Bloomington, July 10-12. http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/ ~gdc/ work/NACAP-
Roboethics-Rev1.pdf 
16
 Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2008), 226.  
17
 Roger C. Schank, "What is AI Anyway?" in The Foundations of Artificial Intelligence: 
A Sourcebook, ed. Derek Partridge and Yorick Wilks (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 5. 
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information processor of the entity itself, would need to be considered intelligent. 
In philosophical terms, intelligence is considered to be a necessary and sufficient 
condition for communicative behavior. For this reason, Turing estimates that 
developments in machine communication will advance to such an degree that it 
will make sense to speak (and to speak intelligently) of machine intelligence by 
the end of the twentieth century. "I predict," Turing writes, "that by the end of the 
century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much 
that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be 
contradicted." 18  Although this statement follows quite logically from Turing's 
argument, there has been and continues to be considerable resistance to it. For 
Turing, the critical challenge was already articulated by Lady Lovelace (aka Ada 
Augusta Byron, the daughter of the English poet Lord Byron), who not only wrote 
the software for Charles Babbage's Analytical Engine but is, for that reason, 
considered to be the first computer scientist. "Our most detailed information of 
Babbage's Analytical Engine," Turing explains, "comes from a memoir by Lady 
Lovelace. In it she states, 'The Analytical Engine has no pretensions to originate 
anything. It can only do whatever we know how to order it to perform.'" 19 
According to Lovelace, a computer (and at the time she wrote this, "computer" 
referred not to an electronic device but a large mechanical information processor 
comprised of intricate gears and levers), no matter how sophisticated its 
programming, only does what we tell it to do. We can, in fact, write a software 
program, like ELIZA, that takes verbal input, extracts keywords, rearranges these 
words according to preprogrammed scripts, and spits out readable results. This 
does not, however, necessarily mean that such a machine is capable of original 
thought or of understanding what is stated in even a rudimentary way.  
This position is taken up and further developed by John Searle in his 
famous "Chinese Room" example. This intriguing and influential thought 
experiment, introduced in 1980 with the essay "Minds, Brains, and Programs" and 
elaborated in subsequent publications, was offered as an argument against the 
claim of strong AI—that machines are able to achieve intelligent thought: 
Imagine a native English speaker who knows no Chinese locked in 
a room full of boxes of Chinese symbols (a data base) together 
with a book of instructions for manipulating the symbols (the 
program). Imagine that people outside the room send in other 
Chinese symbols which, unknown to the person in the room, are 
questions in Chinese (the input). And imagine that by following 
the instructions in the program the man in the room is able to pass 
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 Turing, 44. 
19
 Turing, 50 (italics in the original). 
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out Chinese symbols which are correct answers to the questions 
(the output). The program enables the person in the room to pass 
the Turing Test for understanding Chinese but he does not 
understand a word of Chinese.20  
The point of Searle's imaginative albeit ethnocentric illustration is quite simple—
simulation is not the real thing. Merely shifting verbal symbols around in a way 
that looks like linguistic understanding is not really an understanding of the 
language. A computer, as Terry Winograd explains, does not really understand the 
linguistic tokens it processes; it merely "manipulates symbols without respect to 
their interpretation."21 Or, as Searle concludes, registering the effect of this insight 
on the standard test for artificial intelligence: "This shows that the Turing test fails 
to distinguish real mental capacities from simulations of those capacities. 
Simulation is not duplication."22  
 The difference between Turing's position and that of Lovelace, Searle, and 
Winograd depends on how one understands and operationalizes words like 
"intelligence," "thought," and "understanding." Initially these capabilities, what 
modern philosophers often situated under the general term "rationality," were 
what distinguished the human being from other things, most notably other living 
creatures, like animals, and artificially constructed mechanisms, like automatons 
or robots. For a modern thinker, like Rene Descartes, what distinguishes the 
human being from both the animal and machine is the fact that the former is 
capable of rational thought whereas animals and machines are mere mechanisms 
that operate without the faculty of reason. Conceptualized in this fashion, the 
animal and machine (or what Descartes identified with the hybrid term bête-
machine) were effectively indistinguishable and ontologically the same. "If any 
such machine," Descartes wrote, "had the organs and outward shape of a monkey 
or of some other animal that lacks reason, we should have no means of knowing 
that they did not possess entirely the same nature as these animals."23 What allows 
the human being to be differentiated from both the animal and a human-looking 
automaton is that human beings think and give evidence of this by way of 
expressing themselves in language. If one were, for example, confronted with a 
cleverly designed machine that looked and behaved like a human being, there 
                                                 
20
 John Searle, "The Chinese Room," in The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, 
ed. R. A. Wilson and F. Keil (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 115. 
21
 Terry Winograd, "Thinking Machines: Can there be? Are we?" in The Foundations of 
Artificial Intelligence: A Sourcebook., ed. Derek Partridge and Yorick Wilks 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 187. 
22
 Searle, 115. 
23
 Rene Descartes, Selected Philosophical Writings, trans. John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 44. 
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would, Descartes argues, be a least one very certain means of recognizing that 
these artificial figures are in fact machines and not real men: 
They could never use words, or put together other signs, as we do 
in order to declare our thoughts to others. For we can certainly 
conceive of a machine so constructed that it utters words, and even 
utters words which correspond to bodily actions causing a change 
in its organs (e.g. if you touch it in one spot it asks what you want 
of it, if you touch it in another it cries out that you are hurting it, 
and so on). But it is not conceivable that such a machine should 
produce different arrangements of words so as to give an 
appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its 
presence, as the dullest of men can do.24 
Turing's game of imitation leverages this Cartesian tradition. If, in fact, a machine 
is able, as Descartes wrote, "to produce different arrangements of words so as to 
give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence," then 
we would, Turing argues, have to conclude that it was just as much a thinking 
rational agent as another human being. But as soon as this capacity became 
experimentally possible with ELIZA and similar chatter bots, theorists like Searle 
add an additional qualifying criterion. Searle, therefore, recognizes that machines 
are able to manipulate linguistic tokens in order to compose sentences that make 
sense and are seemingly intelligible. But that is not, he maintains, what is 
involved with true intelligence. Something more is needed, namely that one 
"understand" the meaning of the words that are manipulated.25 Although there is 
                                                 
24
 Descartes, 44-45.  
25
 Although this appears to be a rather reasonable qualification, it falls victim to what 
Blay Whitby ("On Computable Morality: An Examination of Machines as Moral 
Advisors," in Machine Ethics, ed. Michael Anderson and Susan Leigh Anderson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 144) identifies as a variant of the "no 
true Scotsman fallacy." The "No True Scotsman Fallacy," which was introduced by 
Antony Flew in his Thinking About Thinking (Fontana: London, 1975), is a way of re-
interpreting evidence, in order to prevent the refutation of one's position. "Imagine," 
Flew writes, "Hamish McDonald, a Scotsman, sitting down with his Glasgow Morning 
Herald and seeing an article about how the "Brighton Sex Maniac Strikes Again." 
Hamish is shocked and declares that "No Scotsman would do such a thing." The next 
day he sits down to read his Glasgow Morning Herald again and this time finds an 
article about an Aberdeen man whose brutal actions make the Brighton sex maniac 
seem almost gentlemanly. This fact shows that Hamish was wrong in his opinion but is 
he going to admit this? Not likely. This time he says, 'No true Scotsman would do such 
a thing.'" In a similar way, Searle seeks to protect human exceptionalism from machinic 
incursion by redefining what is meant by the term "intelligence."  
 
Gunkel / Communication and AI
communication+1 Vol. 1 [2012], Iss. 1, Article 1
9
and remains considerable debate in the AI community whether the successful 
simulation of human-level communicative ability necessarily implies the presence 
of "intelligence" or not, what is not debated is that machines are in fact capable of 
communicating successfully with human users in a variety of contexts and in a 
way that is often indistinguishable from another person. And for research in 
communication studies—where communication and not intelligence is the 
focus—this is a real game changer. 
 
The Machinery of Communication  
In Turing's game of imitation, the computer occupied the position of both medium 
through which human interlocutors exchange messages and one of the 
participants with whom one engaged in these communicative exchanges. 26 
Despite these two positions, communication studies has, with very few exceptions 
(which we will get to shortly), limited its approach and understanding to the 
former. That is, it has typically understood and examined the computer as a 
medium of human communicative interaction. This fundamental decision 
concerning the role and function of the computer has been supported and 
institutionalized by the relatively new sub-field of computer-mediated 
communication or CMC. This concept, although not necessarily situated under 
this exact terminology, was initially introduced and formalized in J.C.R. Licklider 
and Robert W. Taylor's 1968 essay "The Computer as Communications Device." 
In this important and influential essay, Licklider and Taylor argued for what was, 
at that time, an entirely different understanding of the computer. As the name 
indicates, the computer was initially designed to provide for rapid and automatic 
computation or "number crunching," and for this reason it was something limited 
                                                 
26
 It is unclear whether one ought to use the phrase "with which" or "with whom" in this 
particular context. Although this equivocation appears, to be a small grammatical issue, 
everything, it turns out, depends upon this decision. In making a choice between the 
one or the other, it is decided whether the machine is to be regarded as a thing, a mere 
object, or whether it is considered to be another subject. A similar concern has been 
identified and pursued, although from an altogether different angle, in Derrida's work 
on the gift, forgiveness, and hospitality. As Derrida explains in one of the texts 
collected in Paper Machine (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005, p. 80): "I 
have already seemed to count on the distinction between who and what, to shake it up a 
bit, so let me be clear that in my present work, above all in my teaching, I try to reach a 
place from which this distinction between who and what comes to appear and become 
determined, in other words a place 'anterior' to this distinction, a place more 'old' or 
more 'young' than it, a place also that both enjoins determination but also enables the 
terribly reversible translation of who into what." 
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to the fields of mathematics, electrical engineering, and computer science. For 
Licklider and Taylor, however, the computer was more than a mere calculator or 
numerical processor; it was a mechanism of human interaction that provided users 
with "a natural extension of face-to-face communication."27 One year after the 
publication of "The Computer as Communications Device," ARPAnet, the 
precursor to the Internet, began operation.  As if to fulfill Licklider and Taylor's 
thesis, the actual use of this network "did not support remote computing. The 
network evolved instead to become primarily a medium for interpersonal 
communication"28 
Although Licklider and Taylor had called this new development 
"computer-aided communication," the term "computer-mediated communication" 
begins to gain acceptance in the decade that followed. In 1978, for instance, Starr 
Roxanne Hiltz and Murray Turoff employed the term in their extended 
examination of computerized conferencing, The Networked Nation: Human 
Communication via Computer. Although Hiltz and Turroff used the term 
"computer conferencing system" (CCS) to name "any system that uses the 
computer to mediate communication among human beings" 29 , they had also 
employed "computer-mediated communication" as a generic designation for 
various forms of human communication via the computer, including 
"computerized conferencing, computer assisted instruction, and home terminals 
from which white collar work can be done."30 The phrase "computer-mediated 
communication" was elevated to the status of a technical term in Hiltz's 
subsequent collaboration with Elaine Kerr, which was undertaken for the US 
government's National Science Foundation. This 1981 study was expanded and 
published in 1982 under the title Computer-Mediated Communication Systems: 
Status and Evaluation. In this report, computer-mediated communication was 
defined as "a new form of enhanced human communication." 31  "Essentially, 
                                                 
27
 J.C.R. Licklider and Robert W. Taylor, "The Computer as a Communication Device," 
Science and Technology (April 1968): 40. Also available at 
http://memex.org/licklider.html.  
28
 William Dutton, "Driving into the Future of Communications? Check the Rear View 
Mirror," in Information Superhighways: Multimedia Users and Futures, ed, Stephen. 
J.Emmott (San Diego: Academic Press, 1995), 95 
29
 Starr Roxanne Hiltz and Murray Turoff, The Networked Nation: Human 
Communication via Computer (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 
1978), xix. 
30
 Hiltz and Turoff, 167. 
31
 Starr Roxanne Hiltz and Elaine Kerr, Computer-Mediated Communication Systems: 
Status and Evaluation (New York: Academic Press, 1982), 3. 
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computer-mediated communication means that large numbers of people in 
business, government, education, or at home can use the computer to maintain 
continuous communication and information exchanges.  More than a replacement 
for the telephone, mails, or face-to-face meetings, computer communication is a 
new medium for building and maintaining human relationships."32 For Hiltz and 
Kerr then, "computer-mediated communication" designated human 
communication through the instrumentality of computers. Recent employments 
and characterizations of CMC have reiterated and solidified this characterization. 
For Susan Herring, editor of one of the first published collection of essays 
addressing the subject, "computer-mediated communication is communication 
that takes place between human beings via the instrumentality of computers."33  
And John December, editor of the now defunct Computer-Mediated 
Communication Magazine, answers the self-reflective question "What is CMC?" 
with a similar definition: "Computer-mediated communication is a process of 
human communication via computers."34 
Defining the role and function of the computer in this manner is both 
intuitively attractive and conceptually sound. In fact, it possesses at least three 
advantages for scholars of communication. First, it situates the computer at an 
identifiable position within the process model of communication, which was 
initially formalized in Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver's The Mathematical 
Theory of Communication. According to Shannon and Weaver, communication is 
a dyadic process bounded, on the one side, by an information source or sender 
and, on the other side, by a receiver. These two participants are connected by a 
communication channel or medium through which messages selected by the 
sender are conveyed to the receiver35 (Figure 3).  
                                                 
32
 Hiltz and Kerr, ix. 
33
 Susan Herring, Computer-Mediated Communication: Linguistic, Social and Cross-
Cultural Perspectives (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1996), 1.  
34
 John December, "Notes on Defining of Computer-Mediated Communications," 
Computer-Mediated Communication Magazine (January 1997).  
http://www.december.com/cmc/mag/1997/jan/december.html.   
35
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 Figure 3 – The Shannon-Weaver Model of Communication (1949) 
 
This rudimentary model not only is "accepted as one of the main seed out of 
which Communication Studies has grown"36 but establishes the basic elements 
and parameters for future elaborations and developments. Although subsequent 
models, like those devised by George Gerbner, B. H. Wesley and M. S. MacLean, 
and Roman Jakobson, extend and complicate Shannon and Weaver's initial 
concept, they retain the basic elements of senders and receivers connected by a 
medium that facilitates the transmission of messages.37 CMC locates the computer 
in the intermediate position of channel or medium. As such, it occupies the 
position granted to other forms of communication technology (e.g. print, 
telephone, radio, television, etc.) and is comprehended as something through 
which human messages pass. This understanding of the machine as medium has 
been taken up and further elaborated in the work of Marshall McLuhan, the media 
theorist whose influence extends beyond media studies and into the new field of 
CMC. For McLuhan, media—and the word "media" encompasses a wide range of 
different technological devices, applying not just to the mechanisms of 
communication, like newspapers and radio, but all kinds of tools and machines—
are defined as "extensions of man." This is, of course, immediately evident in the 
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title of what is considered to be one of his most influential books, Understanding 
Media: The Extensions of Man. And the examples employed throughout this text 
are by now familiar: the wheel is an extension of the foot, the telephone is an 
extension of the ear, and the television is an extension of the eye.38 Understood in 
this way, technical mechanisms have been defined as instruments or prostheses 
through which various human faculties come to be extended beyond their original 
capacity or ability.  
Second, this intermediate position is also substantiated and justified by the 
traditional understanding of the proper role and function of the technological 
apparatus. According to Martin Heidegger's analysis in The Question Concerning 
Technology, the assumed understanding of any kind of technology, whether it be 
the product of handicraft or industrialized manufacture, is that it is a means 
employed by human users for particular ends.  
We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it 
is. Everyone knows the two statements that answer our question. 
One says: Technology is a means to an end. The other says: 
Technology is a human activity. The two definitions of technology 
belong together. For to posit ends and procure and utilize the 
means to them is a human activity. The manufacture and utilization 
of equipment, tools, and machines, the manufactured and used 
things themselves, and the needs and ends that they serve, all 
belong to what technology is.39  
Heidegger terms this particular conceptualization "the instrumental definition" 
and indicates that it forms what is considered to be the "correct" understanding of 
any kind of technological innovation.40 As Andrew Feenberg summarizes it in the 
introduction to his Critical Theory of Technology, "the instrumentalist theory 
offers the most widely accepted view of technology. It is based on the common 
sense idea that technologies are 'tools' standing ready to serve the purposes of 
users."41 And because a tool "is deemed 'neutral,' without valuative content of its 
own,"42 a technological instrument is evaluated not in and for itself but on the 
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basis of the particular employments that have been decided by a human agent. 
This insight is succinctly described by Jean-François Lyotard in The Postmodern 
Condition: "Technical devices originated as prosthetic aids for the human organs 
or as physiological systems whose function it is to receive data or condition the 
context. They follow a principle, and it is the principle of optimal performance: 
maximizing output (the information or modification obtained) and minimizing 
input (the energy expended in the process). Technology is therefore a game 
pertaining not to the true, the just, or the beautiful, etc., but to efficiency: a 
technical 'move' is 'good' when it does better and/or expends less energy than 
another." 43  Lyotard's explanation begins by affirming the understanding of 
technology as an instrument, prosthesis, or extension of human faculties. Given 
this "fact," which is stated as if it were something that is beyond question, he 
proceeds to provide an explanation of the proper place of the machine in 
epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. According to his analysis, a technological 
device, whether it be a cork screw, a clock, or a computer, does not in and of itself 
participate in the important questions of truth, justice, or beauty. Technology, on 
this account, is simply and indisputably about efficiency. A particular 
technological innovation is considered "good," if and only if it proves to be a 
more effective means to accomplishing a desired end.  
Third, this instrumentalist understanding has been and remains largely 
unquestioned, because it constitutes what epistemologists routinely call "normal 
science." The term "normal science" was introduced by Thomas Kuhn in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions to describe those undertakings that are guided 
by an established and accepted paradigm. Paradigms, according to Kuhn, are 
"universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model 
problems and solutions to a community of practitioners."44 Normal sciences, as 
Kuhn demonstrates, have distinct theoretical and practical advantages. Operating 
within the framework of an established paradigm provides students, scholars and 
educators with a common foundation and accepted set of basic assumptions. This 
effectively puts an end to debates about fundamentals and allows researchers to 
concentrate their attention on problems defined by the discipline, instead of 
quibbling about competing methodological procedures or metaphysical 
substructures. For this reason, a paradigm provides coherent structure to a 
particular area of research. It defines what constitutes a problem for the area of 
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study, delimits the kind of questions that are considered to be appropriate and 
significant, and describes what research procedures and resulting evidence will 
qualify as acceptable. When the computer is understood and examined as an 
instrument or medium facilitating human communication, research generally 
concentrates on either the quantity and quality of the messages that can be 
distributed by the system or the kinds of relationships established between the 
human senders and receivers through its particular form of mediation. Evidence of 
this can be found, as Kuhn argues, in the contents of standard textbooks, which 
"address themselves to an already articulated body of problems, data and theory, 
most often to the particular set of paradigms to which the scientific community is 
committed at the time they are written." 45  Without little or no exception, 
textbooks in the discipline of communication studies, whether introductory or 
advanced, address the computer as a medium of human communication and seek 
to investigate the effect this technology has on the quantity and quality of human 
interactions and relationships. For communication studies, then, CMC is normal 
science. 
 
Back to the Future 
Despite the remarkable success of CMC, this approach misses a crucial 
opportunity originally identified by Turing—the fact that a machine is not just be 
a means of human concourse but might also be a participant in communicative 
interactions. Although the field of communication studies appears to have 
marginalized or even ignored this aspect, the discipline actually began by trying 
to address and conceptualize the full range of opportunities. This effort was 
initially expressed in Robert Cathcart and Gary Gumpert's 1985 essay, "The 
Person-Computer Interaction." In this relatively early text ("early" in terms of the 
discipline's recognition and engagement with the computer), the authors draw a 
distinction between communicating through a computer from communicating 
with a computer. The former, it is argued, names all those "computer facilitated 
functions" where "the computer is interposed between sender and receiver." The 
latter designates "person-computer interpersonal functions" where "one party 
activates a computer which in turn responds appropriately in graphic, 
alphanumeric, or vocal modes establishing an ongoing sender/receiver 
relationship."46 These two alternatives, which follow from but do not explicitly 
acknowledge Turing's game of imitation, were corroborated and further refined in 
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James Chesebro and Donald Bonsall's Computer-Mediated Communication, 
which was published in 1989. In this book-length analysis of the role and function 
of the computer, the authors detail a five-point scale that delimits the range of 
possibilities for "computer-human communication."47 The scale extends from the 
computer utilized as a mere medium of message transmission between human 
interlocutors to the computer understood as an intelligent agent with whom 
human users interact. Although providing a more complex articulation of the 
intervening possibilities, Chesebro and Bonsall's formulation remains bounded by 
the two possibilities initially described by Cathcart and Gumpert.  
Despite early identification of these two opportunities, communication 
studies has, for better or worse, restricted itself to addressing the computer as a 
medium of human interaction and, in the process, has effectively marginalized the 
other—situations where the computer can be considered an Other in 
communicative exchange. This is not an accident. As Cathcart and Gumpert 
insightfully point out, studies of communication have always and necessarily 
"minimized the role of media and channel in the communication process. The 
focus has been on the number of participants, source and receiver relationships, 
and forms and functions of messages. The media of communication have been 
accepted, more or less, as fixed or neutral channels for the transmission of 
messages among participants."48 Over two decades of communications research 
has, in effect, proven this statement correct. In the field of communication studies 
in general and CMC in particular, the investigative focus has been on the number 
of participants, the quality and quantity of human relationships made possible by 
the technology, and the form and function of messages that are exchanged 
through its system. Although proceeding in this fashion seems both reasonable 
and normal (in the Kuhnian sense of the word), it is no longer, and perhaps never 
really was, tenable. 
First, the assumption that the computer is exclusively a medium of human 
communication, however useful and expedient for structuring and supporting a 
particular research program, is necessarily interrupted and even resisted by the 
mechanisms and machinery of computing. Technically speaking, the computer, 
whether a timeshared mainframe, a networked PC, or any of the vast array of 
mobile and smart devices, has never been a fixed or neutral channel through 
which human interaction transpires. Frederick Williams pointed this out as early 
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as 1982: "The computer is the first communications technology to interact 
intellectually with its users. Most technologies only transform light, sound, or data 
into electronic impulses for transmission, then reverse the process at the receiving 
end. Computers, by contrast, can accept or reject our messages, reduce or expand 
them, file them, index them, or answer back with their own messages." 49  A 
similar insight was provided by Ithiel de Sola Pool in the foreword to Wilson 
Dizard's The Coming Information Age: "Prior to the computer, every 
communication device took a message that had been composed by a human being 
and (with some occasional loss) delivered it unchanged to another human being. 
The computer for the first time provides a communication device by which a 
person may receive a message quite different from what any human sent."50 And 
Cathcart and Gumpert draw a similar conclusion: "For the first time, a technology 
can not only speed and expand message exchange, but it can also respond with its 
own message to a human partner. The computer in this mode becomes a proxy for 
a sender-receiver in the communication dyad."51  
For these early theorists, the computer was not able to be reduced to the 
customary instrument of communication. Although other technological 
innovations (e.g. printing, phonography, telegraphy, telephone, radio, film, 
television, etc.) may function appropriately as a kind of technical intermediary 
through which human beings exchange messages, the computer deviates from this 
expectation and interrupts its procedure. Instead of functioning as an immaterial 
and more-or-less transparent channel through which human agents exchange 
messages, the computer participates in and contaminates the process. It acts on the 
messages, significantly alters them, and delivers information that was not 
necessarily selected, composed, or even controlled by human participants. These 
various occurrences, furthermore, cannot be reduced to a form of unintentional 
noise introduced by the exigencies of the channel, which is precisely how the 
process models have dispensed with and accounted for this kind of machinic 
contribution. As Chesebro and Bonsall point out, "other communication 
technologies may affect the substantive meaning of a human message, but the 
alteration is typically an unintended by-product of the medium. The computer, on 
the other hand, is employed because it will reformat the ideas contained in a 
human message." 52  With the other media of communication, changes in the 
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human-generated message are explained as unintentional noise imparted by the 
instrument of transmission. With the computer, such alterations cannot be reduced 
to mere noise. They are necessary and integral elements of its function. The 
computer, therefore, substantively resists being exclusively defined as a medium 
and instrument through which human users exchange messages. Instead, it 
actively participates in communicative exchanges as a kind of additional agent 
and/or (inter)active co-conspirator.  
Second, recognition that the computer can also be considered a participant 
in communicative exchange is not something that remains a mere theoretical 
possibility, it is already practically necessary. Consider, for instance, unwanted 
email or spam. Spam messages, which inform Internet users of everything from 
herbal supplements, which promise to enhance the size and operation of various 
parts of the body, to bogus stock and investment opportunities, are generated by 
and originate with a computer. As a result of the seemingly unrestrained 
proliferation of this kind of machinic generated messages, users and network 
administrators now employ spam filters, which effectively decide which messages 
to deliver to the human user and which ones to filter out. In the era of spam, 
therefore, email is no longer an exclusive instrument of human communication 
but shows signs of increasing involvement by machines in the communicative 
process. A less nefarious illustration is provide by the descendents of 
Weizenbaum's original chatter bot that now populate the virtual environments of 
games, provide online customer support, and interact with users in all kind of 
applications from e-commerce to web-based training. Like ELIZA, these 
advanced chatter bots are able to converse and interact with users in such a way 
that is often indistinguishable from another human being, leaving many users 
uncertain as to whether their online interlocutor was in fact another person or a 
machine. The most compelling and recent innovation in this area is probably Siri, 
which is a commercial application spun-off from DARPA's Cognitive Assistant 
that Learns and Organizes (CALO) program. Siri was initially developed and 
commercialized by SRI International and eventually sold to Apple in 2010. The 
software application was popularized via iPhone 4 and is currently an integral 
component of the company's iOS 6, an operating system for mobile devices, smart 
phones, and tablets. Siri has been described and marketed as "an intelligent 
personal assistant" and "knowledge navigator." It consists of a natural language 
user interface that can understand and process spoken commands and inquiries in 
a number of languages, a voice synthesis output device that supplies audible 
responses, and an impressive backend that is able to interact with and perform 
queries on both the local device and Internet-based data sources. Although Siri is 
by no means "intelligent" in the "strong AI" sense of the word, she (and the 
default vocal characteristics already gender the application female) is able to 
interact with human users as a smart and responsive interlocutor. In one of 
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Apple's clever television commercials from 2012, actor John Malkovich has a 
rather heady conversation with Siri, asking her for, among other things, advice 
about living the good life, where to find the best Italian cuisine, and a joke. 
 
Conclusions – Paradigm Shift 
So where does this leave us? Let me conclude with three statements that 
have, at this particular point in time, something of an apocalyptic tone. First, 
communication studies as we have known and practiced it is at an end. We need, 
however, to be cautious with how we understand and employ the word "end" in 
this particular context. In the field of communication studies, the operative 
paradigm—the framework that has defined what is considered normal science—
situates technology as a tool or instrument of message exchange between human 
users. This particular understanding has been supported and codified by the 
dominant forms of communication theory, has guided and informed the accepted 
practices of communication research, and has been considered normal and 
virtually beyond question by a particular community of scholars. Because this 
conceptualization has been accepted as normative, the computer and other forms 
of information technology have been accommodated to fit the dominant 
paradigm. And the success of this effort is clearly evident within the last three 
decades of the twentieth century with the phenomenal growth of CMC as a 
recognized area of investigation and its institutionalization within professional 
organizations, university curricula, and standard textbooks and scholarly journals. 
At the same time, however, it is increasingly clear that the computer has not and 
does not behave according to this paradigmatic structure and effectively 
challenges long standing assumptions about the role and function of technology in 
communication. This challenge does not proceed from the successful achievement 
of "strong AI"; it is already deployed by and evident in seemingly "dumb" 
applications like email spam and chatter bots. The computer, therefore, constitutes 
what Kuhn would call an "anomaly."53 It is something that does not quite fit 
within the dominant paradigm and, for that reason, calls into question basic 
assumptions and structures. For this reason, the computer is not necessarily a new 
technology to be accommodated to the theories and practices of communication 
studies as it is currently defined but introduces significant challenges to the 
standard operating procedures of communication research, initiating what Kuhn 
calls a "paradigm shift." What is at an "end," therefore, is not communication 
studies per se but the dominant paradigm that has, until now, structured and 
guided both the theories and practices of the discipline.  
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Second, a new paradigm, especially during the time of its initial 
appearance and formulation, does not simply replace, reject, or invalidate the 
preceding one. For this reason, the previous modus operandi, although clearly in 
something of a state of crisis or at least bumping up against phenomena that it is 
longer able to contain, can still be useful, albeit in a highly restricted capacity and 
circumscribed situation. Within Newtonian physics, for example, what is true and 
what is false, is determined by the entities, rules, and conditions that come to be 
exhibited within the Newtonian system. As long as one operates within the 
framework or paradigm established by this system, it is possible to define what is 
and what is not valid for the Newtonian characterization of physical reality. All 
this changes, of course, when the normal functioning of Newtonian science is 
confronted with an alternative, like that formulated by Albert Einstein. Einstein's 
innovations, however, do not invalidate or foreclose Newtonian physics. They 
simply reinscribe Newton's laws within a different context that reveals other 
entities, rules, and conditions that could not be conceptualized as such within the 
horizon of Newtonian thought. In an analogous way, the change in paradigm that 
is currently being experienced in communication studies does not disprove or 
simply put an end to CMC research as such. Instead it redefines CMC as a highly 
specific and restricted case of what needs to be a much more comprehensive 
understanding of the role and function of computer technology within the field of 
communication.  
Finally, although the computer effectively challenges the current 
paradigm, placing its normal functioning in something of a crisis, what comes 
next, what comprises the new paradigm, is only now beginning to make an 
appearance. And if the history of science is any indication, it may be quite some 
time before these innovations come to be formulated and codified into the next 
iteration of what will be considered "normal science." At this preliminary stage, 
however, we can begin to identify some aspects of what the next generation of 
communication studies might look like in the wake of this development. For now, 
the shape of the new paradigm is, for better or worse, influenced (or clouded) by 
the current situation, which provides the only conceptual apparatus and 
vocabulary we have at our disposal. We are, therefore, in the somewhat 
cumbersome situation of trying to articulate what will exceed the current 
paradigm by employing the words and concepts that it already defines and 
regulates. This will, of course, affect what can be said about the new challenges 
and opportunities, but we have no other way by which to proceed. From what we 
already know, it is clear that it is no longer accurate to define the computer 
exclusively as an instrument that is to be animated and used, more or less 
effectively, by a human being. The computer is beginning to be understood as an 
Other—another kind of communicative Other—who confronts human users, calls 
to them, and requires an appropriate response. This other aspect of the computer, 
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as we have seen, was already predicted by Cathcart and Gumpert back in 1985. 
Communication studies, however, had (for reasons that are both understandable 
and justifiable) marginalized or ignored it, mainly because it did not fit the 
established paradigm. In reframing the computer according to the insights 
provided by this other and virtually forgotten alternative, all kinds of things 
change, not the least of which is our understanding of who, or what, qualifies as a 
legitimate subject of communication. For Norbert Wiener, the progenitor of the 
science of cybernetics, these developments fundamentally alter the social 
landscape: "It is the thesis of this book [The Human Use of Human Beings] that 
society can only be understood through a study of the messages and the 
communication facilities which belong to it; and that in the future development of 
these messages and communication facilities, messages between man and 
machines, between machines and man, and between machine and machine, are 
destined to play an ever-increasing part."54 In the social relationships of the not-
too-distant future (we need to recall that Wiener wrote this in 1950, the same year 
as Turing's influential paper), the computer will no longer comprise an instrument 
or medium through which human users communicate with each other. Instead it 
will occupy the position of another social actor with whom one communicates and 
interacts. In coming to occupy this other position, one inevitably runs up against 
and encounters fundamental questions of social responsibility and ethics—
questions that not only could not be articulated within the context of the previous 
paradigm, but if they had been articulated, would have been, from that 
perspective, considered inappropriate and even nonsense. What, for example, is 
our responsibility in the face of this Other—an Other who is otherwise than 
another human entity? How do or should we respond to this other form of 
Otherness? How will or should this machinic Other respond to us?55 Although 
these questions appear to open onto what many would consider to be the realm of 
science fiction, they are already part of our social reality. And it is time 
communication studies take seriously the impact and significance of this situation. 
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